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OPINION OF THE COURT
            
The defendant’s name has been changed to protect his1
identity.
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FISHER, Circuit Judge.
This appeal asks whether 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a), which
forbids a district court from imposing a term of imprisonment at
initial sentencing for the purpose of drug rehabilitation, restricts
a district court from considering medical and rehabilitative
needs when revoking a defendant’s supervised release and
requiring the defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in
prison.  The District Court sentenced the defendant, John Doe,
to 24 months of imprisonment upon revocation of his supervised
release with the objective of helping him recover from his
cocaine addiction.  On appeal, Doe challenges the procedural
and substantive reasonableness of that sentence.  Because we
hold that the plain language of § 3583(e) governing
discretionary revocation of supervised release expressly requires
consideration of medical needs, we will affirm.
I.
Doe  was indicted on September 13, 2005 for possession1
with intent to deliver five grams or more of crack cocaine under
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(iii) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.  Doe
entered a guilty plea.  On August 28, 2006, the District Court
sentenced Doe to 30 months of imprisonment followed by 4
years of supervised release.  Doe’s initial sentence was a
significant reduction from the Guidelines Range of 60 to 65
Under Guidelines § 5K1.1, the government may file a2
motion for reduced sentence in circumstances where the
defendant “provided substantial assistance” to the government
in an investigation.
4
months of imprisonment and was based in large part upon Doe’s
cooperation with law enforcement in other investigations, as
expressed by the Government in a 5K motion.2
At the sentencing hearing, both the District Court and the
prosecutor acknowledged that Doe had a severe addiction to
cocaine.  In the Judgment and Commitment Order, the District
Court recommended Doe be assigned to the 500-hour drug
rehabilitation program conducted by the Bureau of Prisons.  In
addition, the District Court ordered that, while on supervised
release, Doe must not unlawfully possess or use a controlled
substance and that he must submit to drug testing within 15 days
of release from incarceration and at least two other times
thereafter.  The Order further required that Doe “participate in
a program of testing and, if necessary, treatment for substance
abuse as directed by the probation officer until such time as the
defendant is released from the program by the probation
officer,” and  “contribute to the cost of services for any such
treatment.”  (App. 4.)  Doe was resentenced pursuant to a sealed
Rule 35(b) motion on August 1, 2007, to 12 months of
imprisonment, which amounted to time served, and his 4 years
of supervised release began on August 7.
While on supervised release, Doe enrolled in the Tri-
State Business Institute’s Academy of Cosmetology to learn to
5be a barber.  In a letter to Doe’s probation officer, a school
administrator described Doe as “a great student” who was “very
dedicated” and had made the Dean’s list.  (Sealed App. 36.)
Throughout his supervised release, Doe kept his appointments
with his probation officer and participated in a mental health
treatment program for his drug addiction.
Despite these positive efforts, Doe was not successful in
refraining from the use of cocaine.  On February 27, April 7, and
April 10 of 2008, Doe submitted urine samples to his probation
officer that tested positive for cocaine.  In an effort to aid his
rehabilitation, Doe was offered the option to waive a hearing on
these violations in exchange for modification of the terms of his
supervised release.  He accepted this waiver, and his release was
modified to include 180 days of home confinement with
electronic monitoring and participation in a mental health
treatment program approved by the probation officer.
The new conditions did not, however, have any
substantial effect on Doe’s cocaine use.  On May 12, May 19,
and June 3 of 2008, Doe again submitted urine samples that
tested positive for cocaine.  On July 2, 2008, Doe’s probation
officer filed a petition on supervised release in the District Court
noting that Doe had submitted six cocaine-positive urine
samples since the beginning of his supervised release.  At the
request of the probation officer, the District Court entered an
order on July 7, 2008, modifying Doe’s supervised release to
again include 180 days of home confinement with electronic
monitoring and participation in a mental health treatment
program approved by the probation officer.
6Again, the modifications did not deter Doe from his drug
use.  On November 4, 2008, Doe’s probation officer filed a
second petition on supervised release, noting Doe had submitted
six more urine samples that tested positive for cocaine:  July 8,
September 30, October 3, October 7, October 14, and
October 21 of 2008.  The petition catalogs the utter failure of
Doe’s rehabilitative efforts:
During the course of the defendant’s supervision,
he has been positive for cocaine on 18 different
occasions.  He has been given the opportunity of
inpatient and outpatient drug treatment, and local
social services of outpatient mental health, and
housing assistance.  The defendant was placed on
the electronic monitor on July 15, 2008, which did
not curb his illegal drug usage . . .
(App. 47.)  The probation officer requested an order that Doe
appear and show cause why his supervised release should not be
revoked.
At the show cause hearing, Doe requested one more
opportunity to comply with the terms of his supervised release.
The government agreed, on the condition that “this is his last
chance.”  (Sealed App. 39.)  On November 24, 2008, the District
Court revoked Doe’s supervised release and imposed a new term
of supervised release of 36 months, and placed him on electronic
monitoring for six months, to run consecutively with his
ongoing term of monitoring from the prior modification.  (Id. at
40.)
7Doe’s “last chance” proved to be another failure.  On
May 6, 2009, Doe’s probation officer filed a third petition on
supervised release based on two more urine samples that tested
positive for cocaine and Doe’s admission on April 13, 2009, that
he had used cocaine during the preceding weekend.  The District
Court again convened a show cause hearing at which Doe
admitted the violations.  At sentencing, the government initially
argued that Doe was making “a laughing stock of our supervised
release system” and that he should serve 36 months
incarceration with no supervised release.  (Id. at 46-47).  Doe’s
counsel suggested a sentencing range of 4 to 10 months, or in
any event no greater than 18 months, of incarceration followed
by additional supervised release.
The District Court then revoked Doe’s supervised release
and imposed a sentence of 24 months of incarceration.  In doing
so, the judge explained:
Well, what I am going to do here is, I am going to
impose a sentence of 24 months with no
supervision.  I am not doing it because you – so
much because you violated the law, but I am
doing it in an attempt to protect you from
yourself.  You know, a serious addiction like that
can only have one final result, and we don’t want
it to happen with you.
(Id. at 53.)  Doe objected to this reasoning, noting “[t]here is
Third Circuit case law that I believe stands for the proposition
that you can’t incarcerate someone for treatment purposes.”
(Id.)
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.3
§ 3231.  This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
18 U.S.C. §§ 3742(a)(1)-(2).
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The government then modified its request and asked that
12 months supervised release be imposed following the 24
months of incarceration and that the judge make “clear that you
are not sentencing him for the purpose of keeping him clean, but
in response to the violations which he committed[.]”  (Id. at 55.)
The District Court modified the sentence to include supervised
release but did not substantially retreat from its rationale for the
sentence, responding, “I can’t say no because the sentence is
certainly intended for, in part to keep him clean.  But again, he
wouldn’t be here [] if he hadn’t violated the law.  So, for that
dual reason, we are imposing sentence.”  (Id. at 55-56.)  The
District Court then imposed a 24 month sentence of
imprisonment followed by 12 months of supervised release.
This timely appeal followed.3
II.
This Court reviews the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of a district court’s sentence upon revocation of
supervised release for abuse of discretion.  See United States v.
Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 542 (3d Cir. 2007).  Procedurally, the
sentencing court must give “rational and meaningful
consideration” to the relevant § 3553(a) factors.  United States
v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).  Where
procedural reasonableness turns on a question of statutory
interpretation, we conduct plenary review of the meaning of the
9statute.  See United States v. Coleman, 451 F.3d 154, 156 (3d
Cir. 2006).  If a sentencing court followed the appropriate
procedures in imposing the sentence, we then look to whether
the sentence itself was substantively reasonable.  See United
States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 2006).  Substantive
reasonableness inquires into “whether the final sentence,
wherever it may lie within the permissible statutory range, was
premised upon appropriate and judicious consideration of the
relevant factors.”  United States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197,
204 (3d Cir. 2006).  Absent procedural error, we will affirm the
sentencing court “unless no reasonable sentencing court would
have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for
the reasons the district court provided.”  United States v. Tomko,
562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009).
III.
Doe’s claims of procedural and substantive
unreasonableness stem from essentially the same contention –
that the District Court erred by considering Doe’s need for drug
rehabilitation in setting the length of his post-revocation
imprisonment.  We will address his arguments in turn.
A. Procedural Reasonableness
Doe contends that his sentence is procedurally
unreasonable because the District Court is forbidden under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(a), 28 U.S.C. § 994(k), and our holding in United
States v. Manzella, 475 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2007), from
considering his need for drug rehabilitation in imposing a post-
revocation term of imprisonment.  Because we hold that the
10
plain language and operation of the statute governing post-
revocation sentencing, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e) and (g), permits a
district court to consider medical and rehabilitative needs in
imposing a term of post-revocation imprisonment, we will
affirm the sentence as procedurally reasonable.
This case turns on certain pivotal distinctions between the
statutes governing post-conviction sentencing and those
governing post-revocation sentencing.  During post-conviction
sentencing, the district court sets both the term of imprisonment
and the subsequent period, if any, of supervised release.  18
U.S.C. §§ 3581(a), 3583(a).  The district court is directed to
consider a variety of factors in imposing an appropriate post-
conviction sentence, including “the need . . . to provide the
defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner.”  Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D).  However, post-
conviction imprisonment is also limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a),
under which sentencing courts are instructed:
The court, in determining whether to impose a
term of imprisonment, and, if a term of
imprisonment is to be imposed, in determining the
length of the term, shall consider the factors set
forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are
applicable, recognizing that imprisonment is not
an appropriate means of promoting correction
and rehabilitation.
This mirrors the mandate of § 994(k), which instructs the4
Sentencing Commission to “insure that the guidelines reflect the
inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of
imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or
providing the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.”  28
U.S.C. § 994(k); see also Manzella, 475 F.3d at 158 n.2
(“§ 994(k) is a directive to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, not
to sentencing courts.”).
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(emphasis added).4
In Manzella, we were asked to resolve the apparent
conflict between a district court’s obligation to consider medical
and rehabilitative needs under § 3553(a)(2)(D) and the
prohibition on sentences of imprisonment for those same
purposes under § 3582(a).  475 F.3d at 156-58.  The district
court in Manzella had imposed a post-conviction sentence of 30
months – nearly four times the maximum Guidelines range – for
the express purpose of qualifying the defendant for the Bureau
of Prisons 500-hour drug treatment program, pursuant to
§ 3553(a)(2)(D).  Id. at 155.  Considering whether this violated
the limitations of § 3582(a), we held that the words “sentence”
in § 3553(a) and “imprisonment” in § 3582(a) were not
coterminous – “imprisonment” is merely one form of
sentencing, whereas a “sentence” might include other things
such as fines, restitution, or supervised release.  Id. at 158.
Thus, we held that “courts must consider a defendant’s need for
rehabilitation when devising an appropriate sentence (pursuant
to § 3553(a)(2)(D)), but may not carry out that goal by
In light of this concession, we need not probe whether5
the District Court’s reasoning clearly evinces an intent to
imprison Doe for purposes of rehabilitation.  We will assume, as
the parties agree, that it does.
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imprisonment (pursuant to § 3582(a)).”  Id.  We therefore read
§ 3582(a) to mean that, at initial sentencing, “defendants [may]
not be sent to prison or held there for a specific length of time
for the sole purpose of rehabilitation.”  Id. at 161.  Because the
district court in Manzella extended the duration of the
defendant’s imprisonment for the express purpose of drug
rehabilitation, the post-conviction sentence violated the mandate
of § 3582(a) and was therefore procedurally unreasonable.  Id.
The government concedes that, if this had been Doe’s
initial sentencing hearing, the sentence would be unquestionably
flawed under Manzella.  (See Govt. Br. 15 (noting that, if
Manzella applied to these facts, “it is unlikely that any argument
could overcome the District Court’s statements of Doe’s need
for rehabilitation”).)   However, the government argues that the5
statutory restriction on extending imprisonment for purposes of
rehabilitation that directed the outcome in Manzella does not
apply in sentencing on revocation of supervised release.  We
agree that, although Manzella clearly forbade imprisonment for
purposes of drug rehabilitation in post-conviction sentencing, it
did not resolve the question presently before this Court.  We
observed in Manzella, in a footnote, that post-revocation
sentencing “is an issue entirely different from determining what
an initial sentence should be, as the revocation of supervised
release is governed by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e) and (g), which
We do not adopt the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit6
opinion in United States v. Giddings, 37 F.3d 1091, 1096-97
(5th Cir. 1994), to the extent that it conflicts with our holding in
Manzella.  The court in Giddings looked to the legislative
history of § 3582(a) to conclude that its restrictions were only
meant to prevent the imposition of sentence based on
rehabilitation, as opposed to the duration of sentence.  Id. at
1096 & n.17.  We clearly disagreed with this approach in
Manzella, where we held that “defendants [may] not be sent to
prison or held there for a specific length of time for the sole
purpose of rehabilitation.”  475 F.3d at 161 (emphasis added).
Thus, to the extent Giddings relies on an interpretation of
§ 3582(a) that we rejected in Manzella, it is not persuasive law
13
mandate consideration of § 3553(a), but not of § 3582(a).”  See
id. at 160 n.4.  Thus we postulated, without deciding, that post-
revocation sentences might be treated differently under the
statute.  We now have an opportunity to resolve this question
left open by Manzella, and, in doing so, to join our sister circuits
who have held that “district courts may give weight to a
defendant’s rehabilitative needs when revoking a term of
supervised release and then subsequently requiring a defendant
to serve part or all of his new and potentially extended term of
supervised release in prison.”  United States v. Tsosie, 376 F.3d
1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Brown, 224
F.3d 1237, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Thornell, 128
F.3d 687, 688 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Jackson, 70 F.3d
874, 879-80 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Giddings, 37 F.3d
1091, 1096-97 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Anderson, 15
F.3d 278, 282 (2d Cir. 1994)).6
in this circuit.
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We begin our analysis with the language of the statute
governing revocation of supervised release.  Under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3583(e)(3) and (g), a district court may revoke a defendant’s
supervised release and sentence that defendant to serve part or
all of the remainder of his sentence in prison.  Revocation takes
two forms: discretionary and mandatory.  Section 3583(e)
governs discretionary revocation.  A district court may choose,
“after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1),
(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7),”
to “revoke a term of supervised release, and require the
defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised
release authorized by statute for the [underlying] offense.”  Id.
§ 3583(e)(3) (emphasis added).  Section 3553(a)(2)(D), which
Congress expressly incorporated into post-revocation sentencing
considerations, permits a sentencing court to consider the need
“to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the
most effective manner.”  Id. at § 3553(a)(2)(D).
Section 3583(g), on the other hand, governs mandatory
revocation in the event the defendant commits one of the
specified offenses, including possession of a controlled
substance or failing a drug test more than three times in one
year.  18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(g)(1), (4).  In such case, “the court
shall revoke the term of supervised release and require the
defendant to serve a term of imprisonment not to exceed the
maximum term of imprisonment authorized [by statute for the
underlying offense].”  Id.  While § 3583(g) does not expressly
The District Court prefaced the show cause hearing by7
stating, “Under 18 United States Code, Section 3583(e)(3), a
Court may revoke the term of supervised release if it be found
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated
a condition of his supervised release.  And, of course, here he
has admitted these violations so the preponderance standard is
satisfied.”  (Sealed App. 45.)
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require consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, it does not
prohibit the sentencing court from doing so.
Although we are confident that Doe’s repeated failure of
drug tests qualified him for mandatory revocation under
§ 3583(g), it appears that the District Court proceeded under its
discretionary authority pursuant to § 3583(e)(3).   Further there7
is no dispute that the District Court imposed the period of
incarceration at least in part to “insure [sic] that he comes out
clean.”  (Sealed App. 55.)  The question before us is therefore
whether the admonition of § 3582(a) that “imprisonment is not
an appropriate means of promoting correction and
rehabilitation” precludes a district court from considering
rehabilitative needs when revoking supervised release and
requiring the defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in
prison.
We are not the first court to confront this question.  In
United States v. Anderson, 15 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 1994), the
Second Circuit was faced with a district court’s revocation of
supervised release under § 3583(e) and imposition of a 17
month period of imprisonment based on the district court’s view
The Second Circuit, in an unpublished decision,8
subsequently reached a different outcome without explanation
or citation to Anderson.  See United States v. Yehuda, 238 Fed.
Appx. 712, 713 (2d Cir. 2007) (qualifying defendant for drug
treatment program “is not a permissible basis for increasing . . .
16
that the defendant required “intensive substance abuse and
psychological treatment in a structured environment.”  Id. at
279.  As here, the defendant claimed that this consideration
violated the mandate of § 3582(a) that imprisonment not be
imposed as a means of rehabilitation.  Considering the interplay
of the various provisions, the court reasoned:
[Section 3583] contemplates that a district court
may require a person to serve time in prison equal
to the length of the term of supervised release.  In
determining the length of a period of supervised
release, it will be recalled, a district court may
consider such factors [as] the medical and
correctional needs of the offender.  Because those
factors may be considered in determining the
length of the period of supervised release and
because a district court may require a person to
serve in prison the period of supervised release,
the statute contemplates that the medical and
correctional needs of the offender will bear on the
length of time an offender serves in prison
following revocation of supervised release.
Id. at 282 (citations omitted).8
a term of imprisonment upon revocation of supervised release”
(citing § 3582(a), § 994(k), and Manzella, 475 F.3d at 161)).
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The Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Brown, 224 F.3d
1237, 1240 (11th Cir. 2000), reached the same conclusion.  The
court affirmed a post-revocation sentence of 24 months imposed
for the purpose of qualifying the defendant for the Bureau of
Prisons residential drug treatment program, holding, “a court
may consider a defendant’s rehabilitative needs when imposing
a specific incarcerative term following revocation of supervised
release.”  Id.  The court based its conclusion on the plain
language and operation of § 3583(e)(3):
Section 3583 contemplates that rehabilitative
factors will be considered in determining the
length of supervised release.  Section 3583(e)(3)
“expressly contemplates requiring an offender to
serve time in prison equal to his or her period of
supervised release, and a court may consider the
medical and correctional needs of an offender in
determining the length of supervised release.”
Therefore, it logically follows from the plain
language of section 3583(e)(3) that Congress
intended that a court may consider the
correctional needs of a defendant in determining
the length of the defendant’s imprisonment after
revocation of supervised release.
See also United States v. Hergott, 562 F.3d 968 (8th Cir.9
2009); United States v. Pitre, 504 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2007);
United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433 (4th Cir. 2006).
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Id. at 1242 (quoting Anderson, 15 F.3d at 283).
Our reading of § 3583(e), and the deft analysis of our
fellow courts of appeals, leads us to the same conclusion:
Congress intended district courts to consider a defendant’s
medical and rehabilitative needs in determining whether to
revoke supervised release and the duration of imprisonment that
is appropriate upon revocation.   This is the most natural reading9
of a statute that provides for discretionary revocation
conditioned upon a district court’s consideration of a
defendant’s need for “medical care, or other correctional
treatment.”  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D); id. § 3583(e).  This
reading also comports with the operation of § 3583(c), which
directs that a district court, when setting the term of supervised
release at initial sentencing, “shall consider the factors set forth
in [section 3553(a)(2)(D)],” including a defendant’s need for
“medical care, or other correctional treatment.”  18 U.S.C.
§§ 3583(c), 3553(a)(2)(D).  Discretionary revocation under
§ 3583(e) permits a district court to “require the defendant to
serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release.”  It
would thus be an odd contradiction in the statute if § 3583(c)
permitted a court to consider rehabilitation in setting the term of
supervised release at the initial sentencing, but forbade that
same consideration – despite the express inclusion of
§ 3553(a)(2)(D) as a relevant post-revocation factor – once a
We are not persuaded in this regard by Doe’s argument10
that the Supreme Court’s admonition in Johnson v. United
States, 529 U.S. 694, 701 (2000), that we must “attribute
postrevocation penalties to the original conviction,” requires that
the substantive considerations permitted in post-conviction
sentencing must similarly act as limitations on post-revocation
sentencing.  In Johnson, the Supreme Court considered whether
the amendment of § 3583(h), permitting courts to require
additional supervised release after the completion of post-
revocation incarceration, could apply retroactively without
violating the ex post facto clause.  Thus in noting that
“postrevocation penalties relate to the original offense,” 529
U.S. at 700, the Court was observing that Johnson’s post-
revocation sentence cannot exceed the maximum penalty in
place at the time of his underlying offense.  The supervised
release statute already provides for protection against the
outcome forbidden by Johnson by restricting post-revocation
incarceration to a term “not to exceed the maximum term of
imprisonment authorized [by statute for the original offense].”
18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(4).  Nowhere does Johnson suggest that
limitations on substantive considerations in post-conviction
sentencing – such as the prohibition on imprisonment for
rehabilitation in § 3582(a) – must also apply to post-revocation
sentencing.  We do not, therefore, read Johnson to require
incorporation of the restrictions in § 3582(a) into post-
revocation sentencing in contravention of the plain language of
§ 3583(e).
19
supervised release is violated and its duration is served in
incarceration.10
20
Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not err
in setting the duration of Doe’s post-revocation incarceration
based, in part, on his need for drug rehabilitation.  The sentence
was therefore procedurally reasonable.
B. Substantive Reasonableness
Although Doe principally relies on his statutory argument
in challenging his post-revocation sentence, he also argues that
the 24 months post-revocation incarceration and 12 months
supervised release is “wildly disproportionate” and “excessive,”
and therefore substantively unreasonable.  (Doe Br. 17.)  Our
review for substantive reasonableness is “highly deferential,”
Bungar, 478 F.3d at 543, and Doe bears the burden of
demonstrating that “no reasonable sentencing court would have
imposed the same sentence on [him] for the reasons the district
court provided.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.  He has failed to meet
that burden here, and we will affirm the District Court’s
sentence as substantively reasonable.
The District Court imposed Doe’s post-revocation
sentence of 24 months of incarceration and 12 months of
supervised release based on two principal justifications:  Doe’s
repeated violations of the terms of his supervised release, and
Doe’s need for drug rehabilitation.  These justifications are a
reasonable application of the relevant § 3553(a) factors to the
particular facts of this case.  As discussed above, § 3583(e)
requires consideration of the defendant’s need for “medical care,
or other correctional treatment.”  18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(c),
3553(a)(2)(D).  Doe’s repeated violations of his supervised
release, his admitted abuse of controlled substances, and his
21
demonstrated inability to rehabilitate himself through outpatient
drug treatment led the District Court to reasonably conclude that
Doe needed to be kept out of reach of the instruments of his
addiction.  Though, as the District Court observed, incarceration
is an imperfect means to that end, it is not an unreasonable one
under the statute.
Finally, we reject Doe’s argument that the sentence itself
is “excessive.”  As the District Court acknowledged, the
advisory Guidelines range for Doe’s post-revocation
imprisonment was 4 to 10 months based on his criminal history
category of II and a Grade C violation.  U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a).
However, the Guidelines provide that “[w]here the original
sentence was the result of a downward departure (e.g. as a
reward for substantial assistance) . . . an upward departure may
be warranted.”  U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4, cmt. n.4.  Here, Doe’s
Guidelines range sentence of 60 to 65 months was initially
reduced to 30 months for cooperation with the government and
then further reduced to 12 months, which amounted to time
served.  His 24 month post-revocation imprisonment was thus
reasonable in light of the earlier leniency he received.  The
addition of 12 months of supervised release upon the conclusion
of Doe’s imprisonment brings his post-revocation sentence to
the statutory maximum of three years.  See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(b)(2) (limiting supervised release for Class C felonies to
three years).  Given the egregiousness of Doe’s violations, we
cannot say that no reasonable court would impose the statutory
maximum.
We therefore reject Doe’s challenge based on substantive
reasonableness, and we will affirm the District Court’s sentence.
22
IV.  Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District
Court’s revocation of Doe’s supervised release and imposition
of a 24 month term of imprisonment followed by a 12 month
term of supervised release.
